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ABSTRACT
Religious education in Russia remains the subject of sharp public 
debates. The paper briefly observes the history of religious 
education in the country. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, 
religious instruction was an essential part of the primary school 
curriculum; the imperial system of religious instruction ended up 
with the Bolshevik revolution, and the subsequent Soviet decree 
of January 1918 that separated church from state and school from 
church. In Soviet times, religion had no place in the moral education 
of children. The fall of the Soviet Union, including its socialist ideals 
and educational prerogatives, led to uncertainty and confusion 
in the educational sector. Today, however, religious education 
is becoming increasingly important. By introducing Foundations 
of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics in public schools and 
Theology in higher education institutions, the Russian Federation 
has asserted the state’s vested interest in ensuring the moral and 
spiritual development of its citizens.
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Introduction: Religious Education in Imperial Russia and Soviet Union
Religious Education is a fairly new enterprise in Russia. Prior to the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, moral and religious instruction was an essential part of the primary 
school curriculum in the Russian Empire despite the state having never instituted 
a system of universal public education. Most primary schooling was in the hands 
of religious communities, from Buddhist monasteries (datsans) near Lake Baikal, 
and Muslim maktabs on the middle Volga to the Russian Orthodox church-parish 
schools across the empire. Although the Orthodox Church was the established one, 
the empire recognised a number of religious minorities, and every imperial citizen 
had to have a religion, which was usually determined by birth and recorded in one’s 
passport (Clay, 2015).
The imperial system of religious instruction ended with the Bolshevik revolution 
and the subsequent Soviet decree of January 1918 that separated church from state 
and, consequently, school from church. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union introduced 
compulsory universal, militantly secular, public primary education that was part 
of the broader Marxist-Leninist project to create a new civilisation and a new kind 
of human being, the “new Soviet man”. In 1929, a new law on religious associations, 
which remained in effect for the next six decades, drastically curtailed freedom 
of conscience and placed strict state controls on religious life. In the same year, 
the Constitution was amended in order to deprive believers of the right to conduct 
religious propaganda while assuring all citizens the right to engage in anti-religious 
propaganda. For Soviet authorities, religion had no place in the moral education 
of children, and their brutal, state-sponsored destruction of believers and religious 
institutions had a deep and long-lasting impact on those religious communities that 
survived the Soviet period (Clay, 2015).
In 1961, the new Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 
adopted with the “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism” as its integral part. The 
“Moral Code” was aimed at the moral improvement of the Soviet people; it included the 
values of the devotion to the cause of communism; love of the socialist Motherland; 
conscientious labour; high sense of public duty; collectivism and comradely mutual 
assistance; humane relations and mutual respect; honesty and truthfulness; moral 
purity; unpretentiousness and modesty in social and private life; mutual respect in 
the family; irreconcilability toward injustice; and friendship and brotherhood among 
peoples. Because of the ideological needs of the time, late Soviet ethical theory was 
supposed to prove the ultimate truth of the communist morality as the highest form 
achieved through historical stages of the development of morality, and to elaborate the 
normative ethical programme based on the “Moral Code”. Interestingly, today there is 
a general discourse, reproduced by both believers and non-believers, that Russia has 
always been Orthodox, and “The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism” is nothing 
else but a disguised Ten Commandments. 
One of the consequences of the introduction of the “Moral Code” was the shift 
from former “militant” atheism to “scientific” one, which served the purpose of not 
only criticising religion but also stressing the positive aspects of atheism as part of 
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the materialist worldview and the source of the elaboration of everyday values. Since 
1964, Scientific Atheism as a part of the state’s system of “moral upbringing” became 
a compulsory course in the departments of humanities and social sciences at higher 
educational institutions in the Soviet Union. 
Post-Soviet Changes
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the religious situation in Russia changed 
dramatically. Today, the importance of the cultural-historical and ethical role of 
religion, especially Russian Orthodoxy, is highly acknowledged by the state. The 1994 
Constitution declared Russia as a secular state; nevertheless, in 1997, the influence 
of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in various spheres of social life, including 
education, further increased with the adoption of the Federal Law on Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Associations. Although this law reinforced the secular 
character of education, it also contained a specific regulation on church-state relations 
in its Preamble. The Law recognises the special role of the ROC in “the history of 
Russia, the formation and development of its spirituality and culture”, as well as the 
importance of other religions like Islam, Buddhism or Judaism in Russian history. As 
a result, these four religions, with Christianity limited to the Orthodox denomination, 
were officially recognised as so-called “traditional” religions of Russia that later 
shaped the system of Religious Education in state schools (Blinkova & Vermeer, 2018). 
Russian Orthodoxy recently experienced its “rebirth” as some 70% of ethnic Russians 
claim Orthodoxy as their religion (Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central 
and Eastern Europe, 2017). However, these figures should be considered with caution, 
as they include people with extremely diverse degrees of religious knowledge and 
commitment (Ładykowska, 2012).
Religious Education in Higher Education Institutions
Since the mid-1990s, Religious Studies (RS) in one form or another gradually 
replaced Scientific Atheism in higher education institutions. RS is no longer 
a compulsory subject in the humanities and social sciences; rather, it is a specialty 
aimed at preparing teachers, researches, and PR specialists among others. 
Presently, the 30 higher educational institutions offer bachelor’s degree programmes 
in RS, while 5 of them also offer master’s degrees specialising in RS. The curriculum 
for both the bachelor’s and master’s programmes includes Philosophy of Religion; 
Sociology of Religion; Phenomenology of Religion; Science and Religion; Religious 
Arts; New Religious Movements; Religious Ethics; Anthropology of Religion; 
Psychology of Religion; History of Religion; Freedom of Conscience; and History of 
Freethinking and Atheism. 
Today, RS is an institutionalised scholarly discipline that has become an 
integral part of the Russian higher education structure. It is represented by a number 
of research centers, professional associations, and specialised periodicals. At the 
same time, the Russian RS community is highly fragmented and poorly integrated 
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into the global scholarly community. The origins of RS in Russia is disputed by 
researchers; some trace the tradition to scientific atheism, while others adopt a critical 
stance towards the Soviet legacy, citing its high susceptibility to ideological bias 
and the lack of a developed methodological basis. Apart from the history of RS, the 
meta-theoretical discourse also focuses on at least three contiguous areas, namely, 
(1) the issue of demarcation from other disciplines, primarily Theology and Philosophy, 
(2) the issues of the subject matter of RS, as well as the number and interrelations 
of the sub-disciplines, and (3) the question of a specificity of the RS methodology 
(Karpov & Malevich, 2015). 
Besides the introduction of undergraduate and postgraduate programmes 
in Religious Studies, 39 higher educational institutions also offer bachelor’s and 
master’s degrees in Theology. Some of them are departments at state universities 
while others are sponsored by religious institutions (mostly by the ROC). 
Theology as an optional discipline is taught in 51 higher educational institutions. 
In 2015, issuing of the academic degrees (Candidate and Doctor of Science) in 
Theological Studies by state educational and research institutions was approved 
by the state authorities upon the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
strong public intervention by Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill. Theology 
was legalised by the Ministry of Education not as a branch of history or philosophy, 
but as a specific discipline. Olga Vasil’eva, the Head of the Ministry, stressed that 
there was a need to “make every effort to prepare specialists” in the theological 
field (Rozanskij, 2017). Many secular academics and RS teachers estimate the 
implementation of Theology (which in reality is the Russian Orthodox one) as 
an attempt to replace methodologically neutral RS with a confessional subject. 
They see the reform as the desire of the ROC to indoctrinate and ideologically 
mould the country. On the contrary, the ROC representatives refer to theology as 
“a church science” and consider “spiritual experience” as a precondition for the 
study of theology.
Religious Education in the State School Curriculum 
The implementation of Religious Education in state school curriculum has passed 
several stages. In 1992, a new Law on Education was passed claiming that “the activity 
of religious movements and organisations (unions) in state schools is prohibited”, 
thus, strengthening the secular character of education. At the same time, there was 
a great deal of societal interest in religion and considerable interest by different 
religious communities, especially the ROC, which wanted to be involved in state 
schools. Nevertheless, setting the agenda on the curriculum of Religious Education 
was not an easy task for a long time, and the ROC’s calls for the introduction of a 
compulsory Religion Education (RE) class were not heard on the federal level. Few 
regions introduced compulsory classes on Orthodox Christianity in state schools 
in 2006; in some other regions, it was introduced as an optional subject. This gave 
rise to considerable protest by religious minority groups, atheists and intellectuals 
complaining about the “clericalization of education” (Köllner, 2016).
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Eventually in 2012, a one-year course called “Fundamentals of Religious 
Cultures and Secular Ethics” (FRCSE) was introduced in state schools as a 
compulsory subject. Schoolchildren and their parents have to select one of six 
modules – Fundamentals of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Orthodox Christianity, 
World Religious Cultures, or Secular Ethics, – that the learners would study in their 
fourth and fifth years of school (10–11 year olds). The purpose of FRCSE, as stated 
in official documents, was to understand the significance of moral norms and values 
and to behave in accordance with these principles; to strive for moral perfection 
and spiritual development; to develop primary knowledge about traditional religions 
of the Russian population (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism), its roles in 
culture, history and the contemporary world as well as in the formation of the Russian 
state and Russian secular ethics and with regard to the questions of moral choice, 
to act according to one’s conscience (POOP, 2015). According to 2016–17 statistics, 
Foundations of Secular Ethics was chosen by 40.5% of students; Orthodox Culture 
38.5%; Foundations of the World Religious Cultures 16.5%; Islam 4%; and Buddhism 
and Judaism less than 1% (ORKSE, 2016–17). 
The course remains a rather controversial issue in public perception. On the 
one hand, Russian officials explain that it would help children to develop their ethnic 
identity, moral sense and tolerance. Sceptics, on the other hand, point out that the 
choice of subjects is incompatible with tolerance from the beginning, particularly since 
the study of Christianity includes only one branch, namely, Russian Orthodoxy; as 
well as the content of “secular ethics” remains obscure. In general, the introduction 
of FRCSE was a compromise between the state and the ROC. The state wanted to 
introduce a non-confessional RE course for all students without dividing them into 
“groups of interest”, but such a course was rejected by the ROC authorities since 
they surmised that it might educate children into moral relativism and indifference. 
However, confessional RE provided and funded by the state is against the Law and 
the Constitution. Therefore, the state and the ROC reached the compromise that RE, 
that is, FRCSE, consists of six optional modules (Blinkova & Vermeer, 2016). 
The FRCSE should also be seen not only as a source of RE, but in the broader 
sense as a part of the moral upbringing of citizens through the system of public 
education, which remains the subject of special concern for the state. Substantial 
evidence of the continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet concepts of moral 
upbringing can be found in the document titled Koncepcija dukhovno-nravstvennogo 
razvitija i vospitanija lichnosti grazdanina Rossii (Conception of the Spiritual-Moral 
Upbringing and Education of the Personality of the Russian Citizen), adopted by the 
Russian Ministry of Education as a key standard for public schools (Daniljuk et al., 
2009). The document negatively characterises the 1990s as a period of damage 
toward the spiritual unity of the nation, the appraisal of the type of individual alien to 
national traditions and values, and uncritically copying the Western style of life. This 
document regarded religion as the main agent of the spiritual-moral upbringing in 
Russia prior to the October Revolution of 1917. In Soviet times, the state eliminated the 
church’s influence over public and private life, and pretended to be a “new ecumenical 
church”, reducing the meaning of life to the belief in communism (Daniljuk et al., 
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2009). At the same time, the Soviet state created a supreme pedagogical ideal – the 
upbringing of “all-round personality” – which maintained its significance in post-Soviet 
times as well (Zwahlen, 2015). The document formulated the overall aim of the moral 
education as the formation of morality through personal recognition of behaviour 
based on the socially accepted notion of good and evil, exercising of the moral self-
control, and accepting national moral values derived from the multinational people of 
Russia, civil society, labour, art, science, religion, nature, and humankind. The basic 
national moral values included patriotism, social solidarity, justice, dignity, freedom 
of conscience, loyalty to family, care of elderly and youth, creativity, tolerance, peace, 
social progress, respect to traditional Russian religions, scientific knowledge, art and 
literature, ecology, diversity of cultures and nations, and so on (Daniljuk et al., 2009). 
Conclusion
After the breakdown of the Soviet system and collapse of socialist ideals, education, 
which under socialism was highly respected and intended for the creation of the “new 
socialist human being”, had lost most of its previous prestige. The fall of the Soviet 
Union, including its socialist ideals and educational prerogatives, led to uncertainty 
and confusion in the educational sector. The formerly coherent curriculum gave way 
to a plethora of different and sometimes conflicting approaches. Today, however, 
Religious Education is becoming increasingly important, with its widespread 
introduction in state schools and new efforts to re-ideologise it by drawing on so-
called traditional religions in Russia, namely, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, 
and Judaism. Religious Education in state schools has the potential to reinforce 
the importance of education in general and to bring back the prominent position, 
which it had under socialism (Ładykowska, 2016). By introducing FRCSE in public 
schools and Theology in higher education institutions, the Russian Federation has 
asserted the state’s vested interest in ensuring the moral and spiritual development 
of its citizens. The paradox though is that, at the official level, the state declares its 
devotion to the freedom of conscience as a fundamental principle of human rights. 
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